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Abstract
A non-monotonic logic of institutional agency is
deﬁned combining a computationally oriented non-
monotonic system (Defeasible Logic) and inten-
sional notions of agency.
1 Background and Motivation
In recent works on agents and on their societies, a speciﬁc
normative line of research has been emerging. This research
assumes that as in human societies, also in artiﬁcial societies
normative concepts may play a decisive role, allowing for the
ﬂexible co-ordination of intelligent autonomous agents (see,
e.g., [Conte and Dellarocas, 2001]).
Of course, there are number of ways that the issue of the
role of normative concepts in MAS can be treated [Conte
and Dellarocas, 2001]). Among them, a formal approach
that makes use of a multi-modal logical setting seems to
be promising. As recently pointed out regarding the de-
sign of computerised multi-agent systems, “modal logic [is]
a means of supplying an intermediate level of description,
falling somewhere between [...] ordinary-language account
of what a system [...] is supposed to be able to do and [...]
the level of implementation” [Jones, 2003]. In this perspec-
tive, a logical analysis of normative notions such as institu-
tions, powers, obligations, responsibilities, delegation, etc., is
one precondition for the development of norm-governed so-
cieties.
The background of this paper comes from the well-known
Kanger-Lindahl-P¨ orn [Kanger, 1972; Lindahl, 1977; P¨ orn,
1977] logical theory to account for agency and organised
interaction (see [Elgesem, 1997]). Our starting point is
to take advantage of some recent contributions [Santos and
Carmo, 1996; Santos et al., 1997; Jones and Sergot, 1996;
Jones, 2003], which have enriched this framework with some
substantial reﬁnements. Despite some well-known limi-
tations (see [Elgesem, 1997; Segerberg, 1992; Royakkers,
2000]), such an approach allows to easily combine, e.g., ac-
tions with a number of other concepts, like powers, obliga-
tions, beliefs, etc. It also permits to provide a simple concep-
tual analysis of the structure of organisations of agents.
This paper is about how some intuitions from the above
line of research can be embedded in a (computationally ori-
ented) non-monotonic framework to account for the funda-
mental activities performed within an organisation. It is a
preliminary work. In fact, our analysis does not deal directly
with the multi-agent dimension of organisations. Rather it is
conﬁned to two main aspects: the modal notion of agency and
that of institutionalised power. In this sense, we will explore
them only with regard to the case of single-agent contexts.
Notice also that the basic notions described in [Santos and
Carmo, 1996; Santos et al., 1997; Jones and Sergot, 1996;
Jones, 2003] are simply reframed here to develop a computa-
tional treatment of institutional agency. No new concepts are
added to the existing logical framework.
As regards agency, we will focus on two notions. The
ﬁrst is the idea of personal and direct action to realise a
state of affairs. In the mentioned logical framework, it is
formalised by the well-known modal operator E, such that
a formula like EiA means that the agent i brings it about
that A. Different axiomatisations have been provided for it
but almost all are characterised by EiA → A (T, i.e., suc-
cessfulness), ¬Ei> (No), (EiA∧EiB) → Ei(A∧B) (C, Ag-
glomeration), and are closed under logical equivalence [San-
tos and Carmo, 1996]. The second notion is that of at-
tempt, formalised by the operator H [Santos et al., 1997;
Jones, 2003]. HiA says that i attempts to make it the case
that A. The operator H is not necessarily successful. Besides
that, it enjoyes Agglomeration as well and is also closed un-
der logical equivalence. On the other hand, there are argu-
ments for adopting [Jones, 2003] or not [Santos et al., 1997]
the analogous schema (No) for H: for the sake of simplicity,
here we will follow the latter option. Finally, notice that we
have EiA → HiA.
One of the main limits of modal logic of agency is also one
of its main advantages. In fact, such a logic is very general
since actions are simply taken to be relationships between
agents and states of affairs. This does not make the logic
very expressive in itself, but, as we alluded to, allows ﬂex-
ibly for the combination of agency with a number of other
concepts. In particular, this holds in order to characterise the
idea of institutionalised power. Such a notion is central for
describing norm-governed organisations of agents and comes
from the distinction between the practical ability to realise a
state of affairs —which is not considered in this paper [Elge-
sem, 1997]— and the institutional power to do this [Makin-
son, 1986]. For example, if in an auction i raises one hand,
this implies that the act of making a bid is also obtained. Inprinciple, this kind of ability should be distinguished from the
practical capacity to obtain a certain state of affairs. In fact,
the attempt to make a bid may not be successful. Whether it
is successful or not, within the institutional context (the auc-
tion), depends on whether that institution makes it effective.
It is up to the institutional rules to establish whether i’s act,
in the conditions in which it is made, makes so that a bid is
effective or not. According to Searle [Searle, 1995], the rules
through which institutions make effective these attempts are
constitutive in character and have the form “X counts as Y in
the context C”. Their function is to create a special kind of
facts, whose nature is institutional and conceptually distinct
from that of the empirical facts.
In their seminal [Jones and Sergot, 1996], Jones and Ser-
got developed a formal approach to the notion of insti-
tutionalised power by introducing a new conditional con-
nective “⇒s”. This connective expresses the “counts as”
connection holding in the context of an institution s. In
particular, when applied to action descriptions, a formula
like EiA ⇒s EiB represents i’s institutional power to pro-
duce B when A is realised (see [Jones and Sergot, 1996;
Jones, 2003]). In a similar vein, but more closely to Searle’s
intuition, it has been argued [Governatori et al., 2002a;
Gelati et al., 2002] that the counts-as link is composed by
a normative conditional V corresponding at least to cumu-
lative logic (system CU [Artosi et al., 2002]), plus a re-
stricted form of Modus Ponens, and the modality Ds —
introduced in [Jones and Sergot, 1996] but with a different
meaning— to represent institutional facts. In this perspec-
tive, A ⇒s B =def (A V DsB) ∧ (DsA V DsB), to capture
the fact that counts-as rules may specify when (1) a brute
fact (e.g., destroying the receipt) counts as a type of insti-
tutional act (e.g., freeing the debtor from his obligation), and
(2) an institutional act (e.g., a contract made by person j in
the name of person k) has the same effects of another insti-
tutional act (e.g., a contract made by k). Ds represents the
domain of institutional facts and so it cannot be a normal
modality. In fact, the weakening of counts-as consequents
is not acceptable in the setting of [Governatori et al., 2002a;
Gelati et al., 2002] since, from Ds(making a bid) should
not follow Ds(making a bid∨drinking some water). In this
sense, Ds is a non-normal modality closed under logical
equivalence and satisfying Agglomeration and Consistency.
Of course, necessitation does not hold: it sounds strange that
> is an institutional fact for any institution s1. Finally, no-
tice that the axiom DsEiA → DsA was adopted to guarantee
successfulness also within the domain of every institution s.
Basically, we will follow here the intuitions presented in
[Governatori et al., 2002a; Gelati et al., 2002]. Though in
1In [Jones and Sergot, 1996] Ds corresponds to a normal KD
modality. This is suggested to express all (logical, causal, in-
stitutional, etc.) constraints on s among which the link “counts
as” is included. In other words, DsA means that A is generically
“recognised by the institution s”. In [Governatori et al., 2002a;
Gelati et al., 2002], as pointed out, the reading of this modality is
different since it is meant strictly to represent the domain of insti-
tutional facts of a given s. In this sense, the English gloss for the
expression DsA is “A is an institutional fact holding within the insti-
tution s”.
different perspectives, however, an important point shared by
[Jones and Sergot, 1996; Jones, 2003] and [Governatori et
al., 2002a; Gelati et al., 2002] is that the counts-as link is
defeasible. This is a crucial feature of this notion. In fact, it
is intuitive that, e.g., if the agent i raises one hand, this may
count as making a bid but this does not hold if i raises one
hand and scratches his own head.
The goal of this paper is to develop a computational frame-
work, based on Defeasible Logic, able to treat this kind of
institutional mechanisms. Although the above approaches
provide an interesting analysis, they can hardly be used for
implementation. This is clearly due at least to the well known
computational limits of conditional logics (see, e.g., [Artosi
et al., 2002]). In this perspective, some basic patterns of de-
feasible reasoning will be re-framed and extended to account
for the institutional dynamics insofar as they are interplayed
with the notions of direct action and attempt.
2 Overview of Defeasible Logic
Defeasible Logic is a simple, efﬁcient but ﬂexible non-
monotonic formalism which has been proven able to deal
with many different intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning
[Antoniou et al., 2000b]. In the last few years it has been
applied in many ﬁelds. Some of the particular applications
require intensional notions; to this end some extensions of
Defeasible Logic, designed to capture such intensional no-
tions (usually described by modal operators), have been put
forward [Governatori et al., 2002b]. In this paper we propose
a non-monotonic logic of agency based on the framework for
Defeasible Logic proposed in [Antoniou et al., 2000a].
It is not possible in this short paper to give a com-
plete formal description of the logic. However, we hope
to give enough information to make the discussion intelligi-
ble. We refer the reader to [Nute, 1987; Billington, 1993;
Antoniou et al., 2001] for more thorough treatments. As
usual with non-monotonic reasoning, we have to specify 1)
howtorepresentaknowledgebaseand2)theinferencemech-
anism.
Accordingly a defeasible theory D is a structure (F,R,>)
where F is a ﬁnite set of facts, R a ﬁnite set of rules (either
strict, defeasible, or defeater), and > a binary relation (supe-
riority relation) over R.
Facts are indisputable statements. Strict rules are rules in
the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable
(e.g., facts) then so is the conclusion; defeasible rules are
rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence; and defeaters
are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their
only use is to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they
are used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evi-
dence to the contrary. The superiority relation among rules is
used to deﬁne priorities among rules, that is, where one rule
may override the conclusion of another rule.
A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r) (A(r) may
be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a ﬁnite set of literals,
an arrow, and its consequent (or head)C(r) which is a literal.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in
R by Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd, the
set of defeasible rules in R by Rd, and the set of defeaters inR by Rd ft. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent
q. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q
is a positive literal p then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q
is p).
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of
the following four forms:
+Dq which is intended to mean that q is deﬁnitely provable in
D (i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−Dq which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is
not deﬁnitely provable in D.
+∂q which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable
in D.
−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is
not defeasibly provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof)
in D. A derivation is a ﬁnite sequence P = (P(1),...P(n)) of
tagged literals satisfying four conditions (which correspond
to inference rules for each of the four kinds of conclusion).
P(1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i
+D: If P(i+1) = +Dq then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +Da ∈ P(1..i)
−D: If P(i+1) = −Dq then
(1) q / ∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −Da ∈ P(1..i)
The deﬁnition of D describes just forward chaining of strict
rules. For a literal q to be deﬁnitely provable we need to ﬁnd
a strict rule with head q, of which all antecedents have been
deﬁnitelyprovedpreviously. Andtoestablishthatqcannotbe
proven deﬁnitely we must establish that for every strict rule
with head q there is at least one antecedent which has been
shown to be non-provable.
+∂: If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +Dq ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −D∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that t > s and
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i)
Let us work through this condition. To show that q is provable
defeasibly we have two choices: (1) We show that q is already
deﬁnitely provable; or (2) we need to argue using the defeasi-
ble part of D as well. In particular, we require that there must
be a strict or defeasible rule with head q which can be ap-
plied (2.1). But now we need to consider possible “attacks”,
i.e., reasoning chains in support of ∼q. To be more speciﬁc:
to prove q defeasibly we must show that ∼q is not deﬁnitely
provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set of all
rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have
head ∼q (note that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas
they could not be used to support the conclusion q; this is in
line with the motivation of defeaters given earlier). Essen-
tially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be
provable, each such rule s must be counterattacked by a rule
t with head q with the following properties: (i) t must be ap-
plicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus
each attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a
stronger rule. In other words, r and the rules t form a team
(for q) that defeats the rules s. In an analogous manner we
can deﬁne −∂q as
−∂: If P(i+1) = −∂q then
(1) −Dq ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.2) +D∼q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either t 6> s or
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P(1..i)
The purpose of the −∂ inference rules is to establish that it is
not possible to prove +∂. This rule is deﬁned in such a way
that all the possibilities for proving +∂q (for example) are ex-
plored and shown to fail before −∂q can be concluded. Thus
conclusions tagged with −∂ are the outcome of a construc-
tive proof that the corresponding positive conclusion cannot
be obtained.
Sometimes all we want to know is whether a literal is sup-
ported, that is if there is a chain of reasoning that would lead
to a conclusion in absence of conﬂicts. This notion is cap-
tured by the following proof conditions:
+S: if P(i+1) = +Sp then
(1) +Dp ∈ P(1..i) or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsd[p] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +Sa ∈ P(1..i)
−S: if P(i+1) = −Sp then
(1) −Dp ∈ P(1..i) and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsd[p] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −Sa ∈ P(1..i)
The notion of support corresponds to monotonic proofs using
both the monotonic (strict rules) and non-monotonic (defea-
sible rules) parts of defeasible theories.
Notice that all the proof conditions satisfy the Principle of
Strong Negation introduced in [Antoniou et al., 2000a]. The
strong negation of a formula is closely related to the func-
tion that simpliﬁes a formula by moving all negations to an
innermost position in the resulting formula and replace the
positive tags with the respective negative tags and viceversa.
In what follows we will assume that all inference rules are
deﬁned according to this principle; consequently we list only
the positive version of the inference rules.
3 A Defeasible Logic of Institutional Agency
As we have seen in Section 1 modal logics have been put
forward to capture the intensional nature of (institutional)
agency2. Usually modal logics are extensions of classical
propositional logic with some intensional operators. Thus
any modal logic should account for two components: (1)
2In this context multi-modal logics have been adopted to cope
with multi-agent institutions. As we said, however, we limit our-
selves to single-agent contexts, since the main aim of the paper is to
demonstrate how to capture the non-monotonic nature of agency in
the proposed framework, and not the relationships among agents in
societies.the underlying logical structure of the propositional base and
(2) the logic behavior of the modal operators. Alas, as is
well-known, classical propositional logic is not well suited
to deal with real life scenarios. The main reason is that
the descriptions of real-life cases are, very often, partial and
somewhat unreliable. In such circumstances classical propo-
sitional logic might produce counterintuitive results insofar
as it requires complete, consistent and reliable information.
Hence any modal logic based on classical propositional logic
is doomed to suffer from the same problems.
On the other hand the logic should specify how modalities
can be introduced and manipulated. Some common rules for
modalities are, e.g., Necessitation and RM [Chellas, 1980].
Both dictate conditions for introducing modalities in contrast
with the analysis of institutional agency as outlined in Section
1. To comply with the properties of this notion, in the setting
provided by Defeasible Logic we have to set 1) the rules de-
scribing the logical inferences and 2) the rules to introduce
the modal operators of agency E (brings it about), and H (at-
tempts). Accordingly we will consider two types of rules: a
set of rules (strict, defeasible, and defeaters) for the notion of
counts-as, and a set of rules (strict, defeasible, and defeaters)
for the notion of results-in.
Since we want to be able to reason about actions we ex-
tend the language of Defeasible Logic with a set of action
symbols; we will use α,β,γ to denote atomic actions. The
intended meaning of an action symbol, for example α, is that
the action corresponding to it has been performed, while we
use ¬α to denote that the action described by α has not been
performed. Given the modal operators E and H we form new
literals as follows: if l is a propositional literal then El, ¬El,
Hl and ¬Hl are modal literal. A literal is either a proposi-
tional literal or a modal literal.
In this perspective a defeasible institutional action theory
is a structure
I = (F,Rc,Rr,>)
where, as usual F is a set of facts, Rc is a set of counts-as rules
(i.e., →c, ⇒c, ;c), Rr is a set of results-in rules (i.e., →r, ⇒r,
;r), and >, the superiority relation, is a binary relation over
the set of rules (i.e., > ⊆ (Rc∪Rr)2).
The intuition is that, given an institution, F consists of
the description of the raw institutional facts, either in form
of states of affairs (literal and modal literal) and actions that
have been performed. Rc describes the basic inference mech-
anism internal to an institution, while Rr encodes the transi-
tions from state to state occurring as the results of actions.
Technically Rr is used to introduce modal operators. In order
to correctly capture these notions we impose some restric-
tions on the form of rules: modal literals can occur only in
the antecedent of rules, while actions symbols are not per-
mitted in the consequent of results-in rules. The ﬁrst restric-
tion is motivated from the fact that 1) results-in rules are the
rules to introduce the modalities and in the present context
nested literals are meaningless 2) counts-as rules make possi-
bile the derivation of institutional actions (modalised literals)
only when they follow from speciﬁc actions (intentionally)
performed by the agent. The second restriction is due to the
idea that results-in rules describe, as their name suggests, the
results of actions, not actions themselves.
Let us see by means of some examples the intuition behind
this formalism. We focus here on defeasible rules but similar
remarks can be applied to the other kinds of rules. Suppose
the agent i is acting in the context of an auction. Then we
may have cases like the following3:
bids, auction begun ⇒r offer
This rule is an example corresponding to the introduction of
the modality E. In fact, i’s fulﬁlment of the conditions in
the antecedent produces the occurrence of offer: i’s action of
bidding has the result that i has made an offer. As we will
see, if offer can be derived, this permits the introduction of
Ei(offer).
auction begun ⇒r ¬offer
The example above does not specify any action in the an-
tecedent (empty action). This means that, when the auction is
begun, i’s refraining from doing any action has the result to
have no offer. In logical terms, also this case can lead to the
introduction of E4.
Let us consider examples of counts-as rules.
raises hand, auction begun ⇒c bids
This rules says that that i’s action of raising one hand counts
as i’s action of bidding, when the auction is begun.
auction begun, Ei(offer) ⇒c ¬raises offer
Also here we have i’s generic refraining from doing any ac-
tion in the antecedent. This example represents the institu-
tional connection linking such refraining, and the fact that i
made an offer when the auction is begun, to i’s speciﬁc re-
fraining from raising a new offer. Notice that the same mean-
ing is assigned to counts-as rules where the antecedent con-
tains only non-modal literals.
auction begun, raises hand ⇒c offer
This rule is an example of the institutional analogous of
results-in rules, where an action and a state of affairs occur
respectively in their antecedent and consequent. However, in
this case the result is an institutional fact and follows by con-
vention only within the institution. In fact, that an offer is a
consequence of i’s raising one hand is not a simple matter of
i’s action results. The attempt of i to make an offer by raising
the hand is effective only if the institution recognises this.
It is worth noting that no explicit reference is made here to
the modality Ds as introduced in [Governatori et al., 2002a;
Gelati et al., 2002] and recalled in Section 1. In fact, the
present setting accounts for the idea of institution in terms
a special kind of defeasible theory. Each institutional ac-
tion theory I encodes in itself all possible inferences that
can be drawn within the domain of institutional facts rela-
tive to a given s. This means that s may be identiﬁed with
3Bold type expressions correspond to action symbols, the itali-
cized ones to state of affairs.
4The ideas of empty action and refraining from doing a speciﬁc
action should not be confused with what it is expressed by ¬EiA. As
we will see, this last corresponds to the non-derivability of A within
I, which can depend also on reasons that have nothing to do with i’s
refraining from acting to realise A.I since all action results are obtained within such a domain
of facts. In other words, the introduction of the modality
Ds corresponds here to the general deﬁnition of derivability
using counts-as and results-in rules. Technically, counts-as
rules are meant to capture the case DsA V DsB mentioned
in Section 1. Roughly speaking, on the other hand, the
case A V DsB will be treated as a special kind of results-
in rule, where the manipulation of the consequent is made
under the constraints designed to account for the idea of
institutional consequence. This is just a technical device
to differentiate the two cases: the logic behaviour of the
counts-as link as described in [Governatori et al., 2002a;
Gelati et al., 2002] is here encoded in the whole formal ma-
chinery corresponding to the deﬁnitions of the proof condi-
tions.
Such proof conditions are as follows. For counts-as deriv-
ability (Rc) we assume the basic conditions of Defeasible
Logic given in Section 2. Thus ±Dc, ±∂c correspond, re-
spectively, to ±D and ±∂.
The conditions for derivations involving results-in rules are
more complicated since we have to cater for more possibili-
ties. First of all we have that I ` Ep if either I ` +Drp or
I ` +∂rp, and I ` Hp if I ` +Srp. In other words it is possi-
ble to derive Ep if we have either a strict of defeasible deriva-
tion of p using both results-in and counts-as rules, and that
an agent (in an institution I) attempts p (Hp) if I supports p
using counts-as ad results-in rules. The output of a results-in
rule produces E modal literals, and we have seen in Section 1
that the E operator is a success operator; therefore we add the
conditions that it is possible to derive +Dcp from +Drp and
+∂cp from +∂rp.
In the same way we have that −∂rp corresponds to ¬Ep
and −Sp to ¬Hp. This is in agreement with the principle of
strong negation used to deﬁne the inference conditions.
+Dr: if P(i+1) = +Drp then
(1) Ep ∈ F; or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rc
s[p] ∀a,α ∈ A(r):
+Dra,+Dc ∈ α ∈ P(1..i); or
(3) ∃r ∈ Rr
s[p] ∀a,Eb,α ∈ A(r):
+Dca,+Drb,+Dcα ∈ P(1..i).
To prove an indefeasible brings it about, we need either that it
is given as a fact (1), or that we have a strict rule for results-in
(an irrevocable policy) whose antecedent is indisputable (3).
However we have another case (2): if an agent knows that B is
an indisputable consequence of A in the institution (it always
is the case that A counts as B), and it produces A, then it must
realise B. This is in contrast with the NML interpretation
whereby the agent has to brings it about all the consequences
of his/her actions.
+Sr: if P(i+1) = +Srp then
(1) Ep ∈ F; or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rc
sd[p] ∀a,α ∈ A(r):
+Sra,+Scα ∈ P(1..i); or
(3) ∃r ∈ Rr
sd[p] ∀a,Eb,α ∈ A(r):
+Sca,+Srb,+Scα ∈ P(1..i).
The inference conditions for H are very similar to those for
strong brings it about; essentially they are monotonic proofs
using both the monotonic part (strict rules) and the supportive
non-monotonic part (defeasible rules) of a defeasible institu-
tional action theory.
To capture the results of defeasible actions we have to use
thesuperiorityrelationstoresolveconﬂicts. Thuswecangive
the following deﬁnition for the inference rules for +∂r.
+∂r: if P(i+1) = +∂rp then
(1) +Drp ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) −Dc∼p,−Dr∼p ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ Rc
sd[p] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂ra ∈ P(1..i), or
∃r ∈ RI
sd[p] ∀Eb,a,α ∈ A(s):
+∂ra,+∂ca,+∂cα ∈ P(1..i); and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼p] either
(2.3.1) ∃α ∈ A(s) : −∂cα ∈ P(1..i), or
(2.3.2) if s ∈ Rc[∼p] then
∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂ca ∈ P(1..i); and
if s ∈ Rr[∼p] then either
∃Ea ∈ A(s) : −∂ra ∈ P(1..i) or
∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂ca ∈ P(1..i); or
(2.3.3) ∃t ∈ R[p] such that t > s and
∀α ∈ A(t) : +∂cα ∈ P(1..i) and
if t ∈ Rc[p] then ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂ca; and
if t ∈ Rr[p] then
∀a,Eb ∈ A(t) : +∂ca,+∂ra ∈ P(1..i).
The conditions for proving the results of defeasible actions
are essentially the same as those given for defeasible deriva-
tions in Section 2. The only difference is that at each stage
we have to check for two cases, namely: (1) the rule used is
a results-in rule; (2) the rule is a counts-as rule. In the ﬁrst
case we have to verify that factual antecedents are defeasibly
proved/disproved using counts-as (±∂c), and brings it about
antecedents are defeasibly proved/disproved using results-in
rules (±∂r). In the second case we have to remember that
a conclusion of a institutional counts-as rule can be trans-
formed into a results-in if all the literals in the antecedent
are defeasibly executed.
Let us examine the above conditions at work with the help
of some examples. We assume the following theory:
F = {α,p,Eq}
R = {r1 : α,p,Eq ⇒r s,
r2 : s ⇒r r,
r3 : r ⇒c t}.
In this theory we are able to prove Et. The facts ﬁre r1, thus
wecanprove+∂rs(Es). Now, sinceshasbeenbroughtabout,
s is the case. We can use this to ﬁre the rule r2. Hence we
obtain +∂rr, which is Er. This implies that all the requisites
of r3 have been brought about; but r3 states that r counts as t;
this means that t has been brought about, hence +∂rt and Et.
Let us replace r3 with
r0
3 : p,r ⇒c t
This time we can prove +∂ct, but not Et (+∂rt). The reason
is that p is the case without a speciﬁc “intention” of the agent
to bring it about. Similarly, if we replace r3 by
r00
3 : Er ⇒c t
we can no longer derive Et. In this case Er is understood as a
mere institutional fact, and not as the successful intention of
the agent to realise r in order to realise t.In the previous example we have seen how we can argue in
favour of Ep (for same literal p). Let us examine the condi-
tions to attack it. Let I be the following institutional defeasi-
ble theory
F = {α,p,q}
R = {r1 : α,p ⇒r s,
r2 : q ⇒c r,
r3 : p,r ⇒c ¬s}.
Clearly Es (+∂rs) is not derivable from the given theory since
there is an applicable rule for ¬s. r3 is applicable since we
can derive +∂cr. Similarly, if we replace r2 with q ⇒r r, r3 is
still applicable. We can prove +∂rr: this means that there is
a successful action resulting in r. In general to discard a rule
we have to show that some of the premises cannot be derived.
With a factual literal we have to show that the literal is not the
case (or, in other terms, that there are no literals that count as
it), and that the literal is not the result of a successful action:
results of successful actions are indeed the case.
To illustrate the role of the superiority relation we use the
following set of rules
R = {r1 : a ⇒c p,
r2 : b ⇒r ¬p}
in relation with some scenarios.
In the ﬁrst case we have F = {a,b}. Here the two rules
are conﬂicting both at the counts-as level and at the results-
in level, and there is no way to solve the conﬂict. Hence we
derive −∂cp and −∂r¬p (¬Ei¬p).
In the second scenario we assume a and b as facts and
r1 > r2. This means that we consider the counts-as rule
stronger that the results-in rule. Accordingly we obtain +∂cp
and ∂r¬p. Consider the following concrete example
r1 : minor ⇒c ¬legallyResponsible
r2 : signDocument ⇒r legallyResponsible
r1 > r2
where we derive +∂c¬legallyResponsible
In the third scenario we have the same facts as before but
we reverse the order of the superiority relation, i.e., r2 > r1.
In this case the consequences of the facts are −δcp, +∂c¬p
and +∂r¬p (Ei¬p).
r1 : minor ⇒c ¬legallyResponsible
r2 : signDocument,tutorApproval ⇒r legallyResponsible
r2 > r1
Here we have that i brings it about that she is legally respon-
sible.
The last case involves Eia and b as facts, and r1 > r2. The
effect of Eia is that now r1 can be conceived as a results-in
rule, thuswehave+∂rp, +∂cp; rememberthattheEi operator
is a success operator, and −∂r¬p.
Let us consider the following chess example: the chess
rules state that a drawn can be claimed after 50 consecutive
moves without a capture or without moving a pawn (article
9.5, comma a of the Laws of Chess). This comma can be
represented as follows:
r1 : 50moves ⇒c draw
On the other hand it is known that a position with King,
Knight and Bishop vs King leads to a victory, if properly
played, in less that 35 moves. Hence we have
r2 : KNBvsK ⇒r ¬draw
Moreover since the ﬁrst rule is an ofﬁcial chess rule it is
stronger than the second, thus the superiority relation is r1 >
r2. If player i makes a mistake in the crucial point of the
sequence leading to checkmate the opponent king can mo-
mentarily escape checkmate gaining precious moves. In this
case the mistake made by player i results in 50 consecutive
moves without capture and without moving a pawn. In this
case we have KNBvsK and can assume E(50moves) as a fact.
With those premises we derive E(draw).
The superiority relation does not play a very relevant role
inthederivationofresults-inconclusions. Itistheusualsupe-
riority relation of defeasible logic. Moreover, in general, the
superiority relation does not increase the expressive power of
defeasible logic. In fact it can be simulated, in a modular and
incremental way, in terms of the other components [Antoniou
et al., 2001]. Although we do not have a formal results for
the present variant of defeasible logic, we are conﬁdent that
the techniques of [Antoniou et al., 2001] can be applied suc-
cessfully in the present case.
4 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a possible way to combine in-
tensional notions of agency and a (computationally oriented)
non-monotonic system. The resulting system seems to pro-
vide a sound theoretical and practical framework to reason
about actions and the states resulting from them in a non-
monotonic setting.
Our aim is just to make a step forward in the develop-
ment of computational treatments of the notion of institu-
tional agency. In this perspective, our contribution does not
include any explicit reﬁnement (e.g., in terms of articulating
new axioms) of what has been already proposed in [Governa-
tori et al., 2002a; Gelati et al., 2002]. This does not mean,
however, that the model presented here cannot be a potential
starting point to achieve new proof-theoretical results. Let us
recall that the propositional base of the modal logic of agency
is the classical propositional logic [Santos and Carmo, 1996;
Elgesem, 1997]. On the other hand, any reﬁnement to intro-
duce non-monotonic reasoning as a crucial aspect of institu-
tional agency has been conﬁned both in [Governatori et al.,
2002a; Gelati et al., 2002] and in [Jones and Sergot, 1996;
Jones, 2003] to account only for the counts-as link. Although
this paper provides a formal machinery to reason about ac-
tions only with regard to institutional domains, it proposes
some inferential mechanisms that may be generalised to de-
ﬁne a non-monotonic theory of agency. How to do this and
which is the axiomatisation resulting from such a generalisa-
tion is a matter of future research.
The logic presented here is just one of the many logics that
can be deﬁned using the main idea of the paper (see Section
3). Non-monotonic reasoning is a complex phenomenon with
many facets. Several variants of defeasible logic have been
put forward to deal with different (sometimes incompatible)intuitions behind non-monotonic reasoning. Accordingly a
designer of a defeasible logic of agency has to chose the most
appropriate defeasible inference mechanism and the degree
of provability corresponding to the modalities at hand for the
intended application. In a similar way the designer can chose
more or less liberal conditions to use counts-as rules to derive
brings-it-about literals. For example in this paper we have
assumed that we can use a counts-as rule to derive a brings-
it-about literal if all the literal in the antecedent of the rule
can be derive as results-in. A more liberal condition could
just require that only one of them is derived in such a way.
Finally, we suggest some reﬁnements that could enrich the
logical framework presented in this paper. In fact, the whole
story of institutional agency is not treated in the model pre-
sented here.
First of all, the model should deal with the multi-agent di-
mension of the institutions. In this perspective, it could be
extended to capture at least the axiom schema EiEjA→¬EiA
(EE¬E) [Santos et al., 1997]. Such a schema corresponds
to the idea that the brings-it-about operator expresses actions
performed directly and personally, and provides a principle
of rationality for modeling co-ordination in institutional or-
ganisations: it is counterintuitive that the same agent brings it
about that A and brings it about that somebody else achieves
A. A ﬁrst tentative extension to deal with this is in course of
preparation [Governatori and Rotolo, 2003].
This extension, however, does not exhaust the matter. Our
framework may be articulated to take into account other
action concepts. For example, in [Santos et al., 1997;
Jones, 2003] the operator G has been also deﬁned to express
the idea of indirect successful action. The reading of GiA is
that i ensures that A. G enjoyes the same general properties of
E. However, instead of (EE¬E), it is adopted GiGjA → GiA
(GGG). (GGG) differentiates G from E insofar as the former
is meant to represent indirect actions. Moreover, a concept
that deserves special attention is that of “practical capability”
[Elgesem, 1997; Jones, 2003]. As we alluded to, this should
be distinguished from the institutionalised power to achieve
a state of affairs. However, such a concept can play an im-
portant role in modeling the co-ordination of agents. In fact,
the inference of institutional facts may be conditioned by the
practical capability of an agent to do things that generate by
convention these facts.
Another issue to be investigated concerns the formal treat-
ment of relations between different institutions. These rela-
tions are relevant when an action takes place in different in-
stitutional contexts and produces diverse, and possibly con-
tradictory, results. Following [Governatori et al., 2002a;
Gelati et al., 2002], multi-institutional contexts are captured
by stipulating that A⇒s B=def (AVDsB)∧(DsAVDsB)∧
(DsA V Ds0B). In the present setting, they could be repre-
sented by introducing counts-as rules indexed by different
institutions. Of course, the superiority relations would play
an important role in settling possible contradictions between
different institutional contexts. But that is not all since the
matter is concerned with the complex problem of the relation
between normative systems [Prakken, 1997].
Finally, one important issue, which we could not address
here, is how to deal with conﬂicting institutional results aris-
ing from the exercise of different powers (such conﬂicts are
implicit in certain types of acts, such as when an agent re-
nounces a power). This a crucial question that requires in
general to develop a dynamic account of the institutional
mechanisms. In this perspective, an important reference is
still Goldman’s theory of actions generating actions [Gold-
man, 1970]. It has been pointed out to us that the generation
of institutional facts via counts-as rules is quite close to the
idea of causality. If so, counts-as relations cannot be reﬂex-
ive since it may be argued that “it is precisely the property of
non-reﬂexiveness that distinguishes a generation relation as
such” [Jones et al., 2003]. This point seems to be problem-
atic in the present framework insofar as defeasible logics are
closely related to cumulative reasoning, which includes the
property of reﬂexivity [Billington, 1993]. Also this question
will be a matter of future research.
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